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Abstract
This paper applies some recent develop-
ments in international trade theory to processed
agricultural product markets. Theoretical results
are derived showing that when such markets are
characterized by imperfect competition, there may
be a case for government intervention in the form
of subsidies and tariffs. In order to provide some
empirical background, a simulation model is used
to assess the level of an optimal tariff on U.S.
cheese imports. The implications of this analysis
for the liberalization of agricultural trade are also
considered.
Introduction
Recent developments in the international
economics literature have focused on the impact of
imperfect competition in international markets. In
particular, a‘theoretical rationale has been given
for the use of protectionist trade policies. The
aim of this paper is to explore the relevance of
these theoretical developments to agricultural
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trade, with specific reference to trade in highly
processed agricultural products. Industries in this
sector commonly have imperfectly competitive
market structures, characterized by high seller
concentration, economies of scale and product
differentiation.
The paper is outlined as follows: Section 1
presents a theoretical analysis of international
trade policy when markets are imperfectly com-
petitive; Section 2 reports the results of a simula-
tion exercise which estimates the level of an
optimal tariff for an importing country; Section 3
considers some further implications of this analy-
sis for the liberalization of agricultural trade.
1. Trade Policy and Imperfect Competition
Standard international trade theory provides
little first-best justification for the use of import/
export taxes and subsidies. However, in recent
years, “rent-shifting” arguments for intervention
have been developed. The intuition behind such
analysis is that where markets are imperfectly
June 90/page 13competitive, there is a role for government to use
trade policies in order to capture a greater share
of supernormal profits; i.e., a country can gain by
“shifting” profits away from its foreign competi-
tors to its domestic industry.
Brander and Spencer (1985) initially devel-
oped this argument focusing on the strategic inter-
action between firms in international markets.
The underlying assumptions of their model areas
follows: there are two firms in an industry based
in country 1 and country 2, respectively; there is
no domestic consumption of the product, all pro-
duction being exported to a third country; the
firms’ interaction in the third country is modeled
as a one-period Nash quantity game; i.e., each
firm sets output in order to maximize profits,
given the output of the other firm; the cost struc-
tures of the two firms are identical.
The Brander and Spencer result is best
described using a reaction function diagram. In
Figure 1, xl and x, are outputs of firms 1 and 2,
reapectively; and RJR, and RJt2 are the relevant
reaction functions, which describe the profit-maxi-
mizing levels of output for each firm, given the
output of the other firm. In the absence of gov-
ernment intervention, the Nash equilibrium is
given at C (i.e. the Cournot equilibrium), with
firms 1 and 2 earning profits x, and Wz,respec-
tively. Firm 1 can only attain profits of T‘, with
the aid of government intervention. If govern-
ment 1 can credibly pre-commit to paying an
export subsidy to firm 1, then R,R1 can be shifted
to R\R’,. The new equilibrium at S increases
country 1‘s welfare, since the iso-profit fhnctions
can be interpreted as iso-welfare functions. Ex-
tending the analysis to trade between the two
countries, it is clear that governments also have an




Recently, Thursby (1988) has applied the
Brander and Spencer-type arguments to agricul-
tural trade in third-country markets. The
remainder of this section extends ‘1’’hursby’s anal-
ysis to the situation where a firm exporting a
processed agricultural product competes with
domestic producers in an importing country. (For
brevity, the full derivations have been excluded;
these can be found in McCorriston and Sheldon,
1989).
It is assumed initially that the market
structure of a homogeneous processed agricultural
product is dominated by monopoly firms in both
the importing and exporting countries. Each
monopolist purchases the raw agricultural product
from its domestic agricultural sectors; the price
can be directly influenced by government. The
monopolist in the importing country produces only
for the domestic market, while the monopolist in
the exporting country can produce for both for-
eign and domestic markets.
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has the following profits function:
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where d(y) = a - b~ + X) is the inverse demand
function in the importing country, y being domes-
tic salea and X being imports. r is a consumption
subsidy/tax and s is an import subsidyhax. cfy)
= f + k(y + pc) is the monopolist’s cost func-
tion, where f is fixed costs, ky is variable costs
and @c is the price of the raw agricultural prod-
uct. v is a subsidy/tax relating to the monopolist’s
use of the raw agricultural product. All parame-
ters (a, b, J and k) are positive.
The monopolist in the exporting country has




where D&) = A - BY is the inverse demand
function in the exporting country, Ybeing domes-
tic sales, d(y) defined as before, R a consumption
subsidy/tax, S an export subsidy/tax. C(Y + X)
= F + K(Y + X + Pc) is the monopolist’s cost
function, where F is fixed costs, KfY + X) is
variable costs and KPc is the price of the raw
agricultural product. V is subsidy/tax relating to
the raw agricultural product. All parameters (A,
B, F and K) are positive.
Before considering the market equilibrium,
it is important to outline the intuition of the policy
parameters in expressions (1) and (2). The con-
sumption subsidy/tax, r, R, is aimed at dealing
with any distortions in the processed product
market; i.e., in the case of monopoly power on
the part of the processor, it will be a subsidy.
The export subsidy/tax, S, and import subsidy/tax,
s, are the policy variables associated with the
Brander and Spencer-type analysis, designed to
improve the trade position of the relevant firm.
Finally, the production subsidy/tax, v, V, is aimed
at dealing with market distortions in the purchase
of the raw agricultural product; i.e., if the proces-
sor has monopsony power, a subsidy is used.
From the profits fimctions of the two firms,
it is possible to derive the reaction fimctions of the
two firms in the importing market, which describe
the profit-maximizing level of outputs for each
firm, given the output of the other firm, costs,
and the policy parameters. For the monopolist in





For the monopolist in the exporting country, the




where p = 2B + 2K
Although these expressions look complex,
they have a simple intuition, In the absence of
any government intervention (r, R, s, S, and v, V
= 0), the equilibrium in the importing market will
be the standard Cournot result, similar to point C
in Figure 1. However, focusing on expression (3)
for the monopolist in the importing country, it is
straightforward to predict the impact of policy on
its equilibrium level of output. The profit-maxi-
mizing output level y of this firm varies inversely
to the output level X of the exporting firm; i.e., if
the exporter’s government pays an export subsidy
(+ S), the exporter increases output X and the firm
in the importing country cuts back output y. y
also varies positively in the consumption subsidy
(+r), positively in the import tariff (-s) and posi-
tively in the production subsidy (+v). Similar
analysis of the exporting firm’s reaction finction
can also be conducted.
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monopolists in the importing country, it is pos-
sible to calculate the policy choices of both gov-
ernments that will maximize their respective wel-
fare. This is done upon the assumption that each
government takes the other government’s policy
choice as given. Each country’s welfare is mea-
sured as the sum of consumer surplus, producer
surplus and net government revenue; and when
this is maximized, it can be shown that for the
importing country, it is optimal to use a consump-
tion subsidy, an import tax, and a production
subsidy, while for the exporting country, it is
optimal to use a consumption subsidy, an export
subsidy and a production subsidy (see
McCorriston and Sheldon for proofs). This out-
come conforms to the theory of optimal policy
intervention, which suggests that each market
distortion should be offset at source by a tax-cum-
subsidy policy (13hagwati, 1971). ~ese results
still hold if the assumption of a single firm in each
market is relaxed; however, it can be shown that
the levels of the policies are halved with two firms
in each market and that they decline asymptotical-
ly as the number of firms increase. The rationale
for this is that as the number of firms increases,
the lower is the level of supernormal profits and,
hence, the smaller the monopoly distortion. In the
limit, there would be no government intervention.
The model outlined indicates that the fill
optimum requires all distortions to be offset at
source; however, given the focus of this paper and
the likelihood that policies designed to offset the
monopoly/monopsony distortions will not be
viable instruments, only the constrained optimum
of trade policies will be considered in Section 2.
2. Simulation of Optimal Trade Policies
In order to give the theoretical analysis an
empirical flavor, this section reports the results of
a simulation exercise based on a theoretical model
originally suggested by Dixit (1988). The tech-
nique takes the form of specifying a theoretical
model in which some of the parameters are taken
from external empirical sources and the remainder
are calculated by a process known as calibration
such that they are consistent with equilibrium in a
given period.
In this paper, Dixit’s model is applied to the
U.S. cheese market, which has some of the struc-
tural characteristics outlined in the theoretical
analysis. In particular, domestic cheese producers
compete with imports on the U.S. market; in
many cases, cheese is a highly processed product;
and, also, the processing industry is, to some
degree, imperfectly competitive (see Hornig,
1987, for a recent discussion of the U.S. cheese
market). The simulation is based upon the as-
sumption that protection in the world dairy market
is removed; i.e., the U.S. cheese quota and tariff
system and EC cheese export subsidies are elim-
inated. The aim of the exercise, therefore, is to
assess the optimal level of the import tariff for the
United States.
In the following, subscript 1 refers to U.S.
cheese processors, and subscript 2 refers to U.S.
cheese imports fkom the EC. It is assumed that
there.,.isno entry/exit of firms and that incumbent
firms face caukant costs. Also, U.S. processed
cheeseand cheese imports are treated as imperfect
substitutes. The latter assumption introduces more
realism into the model since, in the earlier analy-
sis, for simplicity, goods were treated as homoge-
neous. Further, in order to be consistent with the
earlier theoretical analysis, oligopolistic behavior
is treated as a Nash quantity game; i.e., firms will
act Coumot.
The aggregate demand functions for pro-
cessed cheese are given as:
Q1 = Al - BIP1 + KP2
where all parameters are positive, (B,BZ- k?) >
0, p, and p2 are prices, and Q, and Q are quan-
tities. The corresponding inverse demand func-
tions are:
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where all parameters are positive and (Z@z- l?)
> 0.
The parameters in equations (5) to (8) can
be calculated by using external data on prices and
quantities and also elasticities, which is the pro-
cess of calibration. Expressions (5) and (6) indi-
cate that there are five unknown parameters: Al,
Az,l?j, Bz and K, Since prices and quantities give
two relations between them, three further relations
are required to solve the system. Following Dixit
(1987), these relations are based on elasticity
information (see McCorriston and Sheldon for
derivations).
Given the structure of the model, the level




where (3~= bi + ~. This expression is found by
maximizing U.S, welfare with respect to the tariff
(Dixit, 1988). All parameters in (9), with the
exception of costs c, and the parameter Vi, are
taken ftom the calibration. Values of c1are taken
from outside estimates, and the values of ~ are
derived from the model. The ~ are parameters
which are designed to capture the nature of firms’
behavior. They are derived by maximizing profits
functions (see McCorriston and Sheldon); and for
Cournot behavior, VJ= hi/n, where b, is the slope
of the demand function and n is the number of
firms; and for perfectly competitive behavior, Vi
= O. Expression (9) indicates that the optimal
tariff varies in the parameters of the demand
system, the relative costs of U.S. and EC firms
and also the nature of competition captured in ~;
i.e., as V, increases, it implies that firms are
acting less competitively and, hence, the tariff
should increase in order to capture the increased
profits.
Using price, quantity and elasticity data for
blue-vein cheese, the model was calibrated for the
year 1980, when consistent price and quantity data
were available. Blue-vein cheese was chosen
because its market has some of the characteristics
of the model outlined earlier. Initially, the model
was used to simulate the effects on prices and
quantities following liberalization in the world
dairy market, the estimated price changes being
based on estimates by Tyers and Anderson (1988).
Then, the model was recalibrated such that the
model’s parameters are consistent with these
hypothetical free market equilibrium values.
Price, quantity and cost data were derived from
Hornig, the wdue of the elasticity of demand e is
based on an estimate by Heien and Wessells
(1988), and a proxy value of the elasticity of sub-
stitution u between U.S. and EC cheese products
is taken from Higgs (1986).1 The data for the re-
calibration of the model are presented in Table 1,
with the corresponding demand parameters being
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Demand Parameters
Aggregate Demand Inverse Demand
Functions Functions
Al 79,814,357 al 27.96
A, 11,920,122 14.54
BI 10,440,856 : (10-7) 1.49
Bz 4,713,346 b, (10-~ 3.30
K 4,197,634 k (10-’) 1.33
Given the estimated parameters, the value
for the optimal U.S. cheese tariff was derived
from (9). The number of firms q was varied to
allow for monopoly in each market, duopoly in
each market and six firms in each market. The
first two cases are consistent with the earlier
theoretical analysis; the latter case approximates to
the market situation for blue-vein cheese as de-
scribed in Hornig. The results of this exercise,
shown in Table 3, highlight the potential gains to
the United States from an interventionist trade
policy directed at the cheese-processing sector.
However, as noted in the theoretical results, the
optimal tariff will vary with the number of firms
in the market. A similar analysis could be con-
ducted for the optimal EC subsidy, using a cali-
brated model of the EC cheese market.
Table 3
Optimal U.S. Tariff
Monopoly Duopoly Six Firms
Import “ in
Tariff USg EC US~EC US&EC
Dollars
per lb. 6.68 3.00 0.91
% of Import
Price 84.00 38.00 12.00
This paper has indicated that in the presence
of imperfect competition, theoretical arguments
exist for protectionist trade policies. However,
some care should be taken in interpreting both the
theoretical and simulation results. First, the theo-
retical results are sensitive to the way in which a
firm’s behavior has been captured. As Eaton and
Grossman (1986) have shown, optimal policies
depend on whether firms compete in price or in
quantity; so that if price is the firms’ strategic
variable, the optimal policy for au exporter will
be a tax. Second, the simulation results can only
be regarded as illustrative; better data for a wider
range of products is required for further work.
Third, it can easily be shown that if one govern-
ment has an incentive to adopt an interventionist
policy, then so does the other government; conse-
quently, it would appear that the policies cancel
each other out. However, the game being played
between governments has the structure of the
familiar Prisoner’s Dilemma. As Figure 2 indi-
cates, in the absence of cooperation between the
two governments, intervention by both govern-
ments will be the dominant equilibrium. This is
because it is always optimal for an individual
government to pursue an active trade policy what-
ever the strategy of the other government.
Hence, the conclusion to this paper is that
even if GAIT can successfully remove distortions
in farm trade, there is, nevertheless, still an incen-
tive to intervene in processed agricultural trade
where markets are imperfectly competitive. As
the no-intervention equilibrium is clearly better
than one where both governments intervene, the
issue is one of how to achieve and maintiiin the
free trade outcome.
June 90/page 18 Journal of Food DistributionResearchDixit, A. (1988). “Anti-Dumping and Counter-
vailing Duties under Oligopoly, ”European
Figure 2 Economic Review, 32, 55-68.
Trade Policy Matrix Eaton, J. and G. M. Grossman (1986). “Optimal
Trade and Industrial Policy under
Oligopoly, ” Quarterly Journal of
Country 2 Economics, 100, 383-406.
I
I No Inter- Znter-
1 vention vention
I No Inter-
[ vention 0,0 -2,2
Country 1 I
I Inter-
I vention 2,-2 -1,-1
Heien, D. and C. R. Weasells (1988). “The
Demand for Dairy Products: Structure,
Prediction and Decomposition, ” American
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 70,
219-28.
Higgs, P, J, (1986). Adaptation and Survc”val in
Australian Agriculture, Oxford University
Press, Oxford.
The first entry in each section of the matrix
relates to Country 1. Hornig, E. (1987). Zle Political Economy of
U.S. Cheese Import Quotas: ?he Creation
and Capture of Quota Rents and Subsidies,
unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Cornell
Endnote University$
‘Due to a lack of available data, the value McCorriston, S. and I. M. Sheldon (1989).
of t corresponds to Heien and Wessells’ value for “Imperfect Competition, Trade Policy and
cottage cheese. Higgs’s estimate for u relates to Processed Agricultural Products, ”
the elasticity of substitution between home-pro- Occasional Paper, Organisation and
duced and imported dairy products for Australia. Performance of World Food Systems: NC-
194.
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